Why Does the European Commission Withdraw Proposals? The Incomplete Information Assumption

Dušan Ristić
Final year Bachelor student
Faculty of political science
University of Belgrade
dusanrstc1@gmail.com
Original scientific paper
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.4926127

FULL TEXT IN PDF

received: 4.10.2020.
accepted: 14.12.2020.

Abstract: While I was analyzing the source materials, I came across theoretical conceptualizations of the European Commission as an ‘honest broker’ in the center of many EU networks with access to complete information in regards to the preferences of other parties in the legislative process. Based on that, we would expect all the Commission’s proposals to find approval, but this is not the case. Using the argument that when the Commission is faced with a lack of information, due to the uncertainty over the positions of the key legislative parties, they withdraw their proposals, I set out to test what could lead to the legislative proposal’s failure and compel the Commission to use its right to withdraw proposals. I focus on two predictive variables: the rising uncertainty over the key parties’ positions due to the elections and possible transition of power in the Member States, and substantial procedural changes that could likewise lead to increased uncertainty. Additionally, I test the explanatory power of the time-lapse variable. When analyzed, the gathered data shows that the rising uncertainty due to the elections in the Member States has very little predictive power. Results for the substantial procedural changes are inconclusive but offer useful insight. In the end, I found the time-lapse variable to have a strong explanatory power when it comes to failed proposals.

Key words: failed proposals, uncertainty, complete information, legislation, policy-making

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