{"id":558,"date":"2024-07-14T16:37:33","date_gmt":"2024-07-14T14:37:33","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/ksiojournal.com\/?page_id=558"},"modified":"2024-07-14T16:37:33","modified_gmt":"2024-07-14T14:37:33","slug":"why-does-the-european-commission-withdraw-proposals-the-incomplete-information-assumption","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/ksiojournal.com\/sr\/archive\/ksio-3\/why-does-the-european-commission-withdraw-proposals-the-incomplete-information-assumption\/","title":{"rendered":"Why Does the European Commission Withdraw Proposals? The Incomplete Information Assumption"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Du\u0161an Risti\u0107<br \/>\nFinal year Bachelor student<br \/>\nFaculty of political science<br \/>\nUniverzitet u Beogradu<br \/>\n<a href=\"mailto:dusanrstc1@gmail.com\">dusanrstc1@gmail.com<\/a><br \/>\n\u041e\u0440\u0438\u0433\u0438\u043d\u0430\u043b\u043d\u0438 \u043d\u0430\u0443\u0447\u043d\u0438 \u0440\u0430\u0434<br \/>\nDOI: <a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.5281\/zenodo.4926127\">10.5281\/zenodo.4926127<\/a><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/ksiojournal.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/06\/5-why-does-the-european-commission-withdraw-proposals.docx.pdf\">\u041f\u0420\u0415\u0423\u0417\u041c\u0418 \u0426\u0415\u041e \u0414\u041e\u041a\u0423\u041c\u0415\u041d\u0422<\/a><\/p>\n<p>received: 4.10.2020.<br \/>\naccepted: 14.12.2020.<\/p>\n<p>Abstract: While I was analyzing the source materials, I came across theoretical conceptualizations of the European Commission as an \u2018honest broker\u2019 in the center of many EU networks with access to complete information in regards to the preferences of other parties in the legislative process. Based on that, we would expect all the Commission&#8217;s proposals to find approval, but this is not the case. Using the argument that when the Commission is faced with a lack of information, due to the uncertainty over the positions of the key legislative parties, they withdraw their proposals, I set out to test what could lead to the legislative proposal\u2019s failure and compel the Commission to use its right to withdraw proposals. I focus on two predictive variables: the rising uncertainty over the key parties\u2019 positions due to the elections and possible transition of power in the Member States, and substantial procedural changes that could likewise lead to increased uncertainty. Additionally, I test the explanatory power of the time-lapse variable. When analyzed, the gathered data shows that the rising uncertainty due to the elections in the Member States has very little predictive power. Results for the substantial procedural changes are inconclusive but offer useful insight. In the end, I found the time-lapse variable to have a strong explanatory power when it comes to failed proposals.<\/p>\n<p>Key words: failed proposals, uncertainty, complete information, legislation, policy-making<\/p>\n<p>References:<\/p>\n<p>Advocate General (2014) Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Jaaskinen delivered on 18 December 2014, Case C-409\/13. accessed April 18, 2020.<\/p>\n<p>Aken, Wim Van. \u201cVoting in the Council of European Union: Contested Decision-making in the EU Council of Ministers (1995-2010)\u201d. Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies 2012.<\/p>\n<p>Boranbay-Akan, Serra, Thomas K\u00f6nig, Moritz Osnabr\u00fcgge. \u201cThe imperfect agenda-setter: Why do legislative proposals fail in the EU decision-making process?\u201d. European Union Politics 18\/2 (2016): 168-187.<\/p>\n<p>Crombez, Christophe. \u201cThe co-decision procedure in the European Union.\u201d Legislative Studies Quarterly 22\/1 (1997): 97\u2013119.<\/p>\n<p>Crombez, Christophe. \u201cInstitutional reform and co-decision in the European Union.\u201d Constitutional Political Economy 11\/1, (2000): 41\u201357.<\/p>\n<p>D\u00f6ring, Herbert, and Mark Hallerberg (Eds.). \u201cPatterns of parliamentary behavior: Passage of legislation across Western Europe.\u201d Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2004.<\/p>\n<p>European Commission (2014) President Juncker\u2019s Political Guidelines, accessed April 18, 2020.<\/p>\n<p>EurLex (<a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/homepage.html?locale=de\">https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/homepage.html?locale=de<\/a>), accessed April 15, 2020.<\/p>\n<p>European Parliament and European Commission. \u201cFramework agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission.\u201d Official Journal of the European Union L304 (2010): 47\u201362.<\/p>\n<p>European Parliament (2014) \u2018\u2018Activity Report: 14 July 2009 to 30 June 2014\u2019\u2019, Brussels, accessed April 21, 2020.<\/p>\n<p>European Parliament (2019) \u2018\u2018Activity Report: 1 July 2014 to 1 July 2019\u2019\u2019, Brussels, accessed April 21, 2020.<\/p>\n<p>Garrett, Geoffrey, George Tsebelis. \u201cAn institutional critique of intergovernmentalism.\u201d International Organization 50\/2 (1996): 269\u2013299.<\/p>\n<p>Crombez, Christophe. \u201cLegislative procedures in the European Community.\u201d British Journal of Political Science 26\/2 (1996): 199\u2013228.<\/p>\n<p>M\u00fcller, Henriette. \u201cSetting Europe\u2019s agenda: the Commission presidents and political leadership\u201d. Journal of European Integration 39\/2 (2017): 129-142.<\/p>\n<p>ParlGov (<a href=\"http:\/\/www.parlgov.org\/\">http:\/\/www.parlgov.org\/<\/a>), accessed April 7, 2020.<\/p>\n<p>Ponzano, Paolo, Costanza Hermanin, and Daniela Corona. The power of initiative of the European Commission: A progressive erosion?. Paris: Notre Europe Studies &amp;amp; Research 2012.<\/p>\n<p>Saiegh, Sebastian. Ruling by statute: How uncertainty and vote buying shape lawmaking. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.<\/p>\n<p>Schmidt, Susanne. \u201cOnly an agenda-setter? The European Commission&#8217;s power over the Council of Ministers.\u201d European Union Politics 1\/1 (2000): 37\u201361.<\/p>\n<p>Shepsle, Kenneth, and Barry Weingast. \u201cUncovered sets and sophisticated outcomes with implications for agenda institutions.\u201d American Journal of Political Science 29 (1984): 49-74.<\/p>\n<p>Steunenberg, Bernard. \u201cCodecision and its reform. A comparative analysis of decision-making rules in the European Union\u201d. In Political institutions and public policy. Perspectives on European decision making. Edited by Bernard Steunenberg, Frans van Vught. 205\u2013229. New York: Springer, 1997.<\/p>\n<p>Tholoniat, Luc. \u201cThe temporal constitution of the European Commission: A timely investigation.\u201d Journal of European Public Policy 16 (2009): 221-238.<\/p>\n<p>Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 2007, opened for signature 13th December 2007, entered into force 1 st December 2009.<\/p>\n<p>Tsebelis, George, Geoffrey Garrett. \u201cLegislative politics in the European Union.\u201d European Union Politics 1\/1 (2000): 9\u201336.<\/p>\n<p>Tsebelis, George. Veto Players: How political institutions work. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (2002).<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Du\u0161an Risti\u0107 Final year Bachelor student Faculty of political science University of Belgrade dusanrstc1@gmail.com Original scientific paper DOI: 10.5281\/zenodo.4926127 FULL TEXT IN PDF received: 4.10.2020. accepted: 14.12.2020. Abstract: While I was analyzing the source materials, I came across theoretical conceptualizations of the European Commission as an \u2018honest broker\u2019 in the center of many EU networks&hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/ksiojournal.com\/sr\/archive\/ksio-3\/why-does-the-european-commission-withdraw-proposals-the-incomplete-information-assumption\/\" class=\"more-link\">\u041f\u0440\u043e\u0447\u0438\u0442\u0430\u0458\u0442\u0435 \u0432\u0438\u0448\u0435 <span class=\"screen-reader-text\">Why Does the European Commission Withdraw Proposals? The Incomplete Information Assumption<\/span><\/a><\/p>","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":507,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"tags":[],"class_list":["post-558","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry","without-featured-image"],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/ksiojournal.com\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/558","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/ksiojournal.com\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/ksiojournal.com\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ksiojournal.com\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ksiojournal.com\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=558"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/ksiojournal.com\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/558\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":559,"href":"https:\/\/ksiojournal.com\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/558\/revisions\/559"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ksiojournal.com\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/507"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/ksiojournal.com\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=558"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ksiojournal.com\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=558"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}